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EXPERT WITNESS FEES
In order to obtain the testimony of an expert witness, a party in a
civil suit or the defendant in a criminal trial will customarily pay the
expert compensation for his services in addition to the ordinary witness'
fees required by statute. The expert witness, whose role is quite differ-
ent from that of the ordinary witness narrating first hand evidence of
the case,1 is asked to use the special skills that he has spent years in ac-
quiring, and which he employs to earn a living. Under these circum-
stances, special compensation seems warranted.2 However, the justified
expectations of the expert present a significant problem to the impecuni-
1. The courts distinguish between the case of the expert who is required to prepare
specially for his appearance as a witness, and one who is simply asked to answer
questions calling for his professional judgment without pre-trial preparation. In the
former situation he will be entitled to additional compensation. Gordon v. Conley, 107 Me.
286, 290, 78 At. 365, 366 (1910) (physician employed by defendant's attorneys to examine
her physical condition and thus qualify as an expert witness; judgment for the plaintiff-
physician for "whatever his services are reasonably worth above the legal fee due to
the ordinary witness") ; Stevens v. Worcester, 196 Mass. 45, 56, 81 N.E. 907, 910 (1907)
(expert witness could be required to express an opinion if he had one, but he ". . . could
not be compelled to study the case or perform labor in order to qualify him to express an
opinion"); Tiffany v. Kellogg Iron Works, 59 Misc. 113, 109 N.Y.Supp. 754, 755 (Sup.
Ct. 1908) (engineer asked to make a computation to qualify himself to testify; claim for
compensation for extra work preparatory to testifying allowed) ; Edwards v. Prutzman,
108 Pa. Super. 184, 165 At. 255 (1933) (judge called upon handwriting expert to examine
certain ballots to determine whether the marks thereon were fraudulent; trial court's
decree directing payment of expert's bill found to be proper). Contra: Chicago & North-
western Ry. v. Friend, 86 Ill. App. 157, 159 (1898) (medical expert prepared a report and
claimed compensation for the time spent in such preparation; court held that the prepara-
tion ". . . was not, in itself, expert professional labor, calling for knowledge or medical
or surgical skill . . ."). If, however, the expert should happen to see a collision between
two automobiles and is called upon to testify as to what he saw, it is hardly arguable
that he is entitled to any more compensation than the ordinary witness.
2. Webb v. Page, 1 Carr. & K. 23 (1843); Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. 1, 26 Am. Rep.
75 (1877); Dills v. State, 59 Ind. 15 (1877); People ex reL Kraushaar Bros. & Co. v.
Thorpe, 296 N.Y., 223, 72 N.E.2d 165 (1947) (real estate appraiser) ; Birch v. Sees, 178
App. Div. 609, 165 N.Y.Supp. 846 (2d Dep't 1917) (physician); Pennsylvania Co. v.
Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 439, 105 Ati. 630 (1918); ORDRONAUX, JURISPRUDENCE OF MEDICINE
140 (1869); Bomar, The Compensation of Expert Witnesses, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
510, 522 (1935). In the case of the document examiner, for example, in order to render
an expert opinion in court, supported by sufficient examples and comparisons to indicate
how the judgment was arrived at and why or to what extent the expert himself is
convinced it is correct, he must prepare photographs, enlargements, and exhibits for the
judge and jury to examine. Since he earns a living at this sort of work, it would be
unjust to deny him a fee.
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ous litigant who may need the benefit of his testimony.3 It would ap-
pear from considerations of justice that the indigent party should, as
nearly as practicable, be given the same opportunity to obtain the tes-
timony of an expert witness as his wealthier opponent. How then can
the indigent party procure such expert testimony? And how can the ex-
pert be assured an adequate compensation for his time and effort?
Judicial decisions on the subject of expert witness fees offer a num-
ber of ways of dealing with the problem, but no satisfactory over-all
solution. It appears that the greater number of jurisdictions are willing
to compel the expert witness to appear in court without the right to de-
mand compensation other than the ordinary witness fees,4 unless he is
required to do extra work by way of preparation.5 Some of these courts
even hold that any agreement to pay more than the ordinary witness
fees is invalid for lack of consideration." This approach enables the in-
digent party to obtain expert testimony, but does not provide any way of
paying the expert for his time and professional advice. It also leaves the
indigent party at some disadvantage in that the subpoenaed witness will
not, ordinarily, be as cooperative and give as much thought to the prob-
lem as the one who has agreed to appear.
7
3. Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943) (malpractice suit in which plaintiff failed
to produce expert testimony and lost; the court held that opinion evidence if not that
of an expert is inadmissable where the the issue is whether a physician exercised the
requisite care and skill in treating a patient) ; Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L. 511, 512, 37
A.2d 53 (1944) (malpractice suit in which defendant was granted a nonsuit, "because there
was no professional or expert testimony upon the question of negligence").
4. Bradley v. Davidson, 47 App.D.C. 266, 285 (1918) ; Ex parte Dement, 53 Ala.
389, 25 Am. Rep. 611 (1875) ; Flinn v. Prairie County, 60 Ark. 204, 207, 29 S.W. 459 (1895)
(expert summoned to testify by the state; court refused to allow him expert's fees in the
absence of any statutory authorization of extra compensation for experts); Swope v.
State, 145 Kan. 928, 67 P.2d 416 (1937) ; Dixon v. People, 168 Ill. 179, 48 N.E. 108
(1897) (physician subpoenaed to testify as medical expert and refused to do so unless
offered a fee of $10; he was fined for contempt of court and on appeal from the fine the
court held that no additional fee need be paid to such a witness not required to practice
his healing art but merely to answer a question peculiarly within his special knowledge,
Walker v. Cook, 33 II. App. 561, 565 (1889) ; Brown County v. Hall, 61 S.D. 568, 569,
249 N.W. 253 (1933); Board of Commissioners of Larimer County v. Lee, 3 Colo.
App. 177, 179, 32 Pac. 841 (1893); Burnett v. Freeman, 125 Mo.App. 683, 103 S.W. 121
(1907) ; Summers v. State, 5 Tex.App. 365, 377, 32 Am. Rep. 573 (1879) ; see also
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2203 (3d ed. 1940).
5. See note 2 supra; see also dicta in Dixon v. People, 168 11. 179, 48 N.E. 108, 110
(1897), and Burnett v. Freeman, 125 Mo.App. 683, 103 S.W. 121, 122 (1907).
6. Burnett v. Freeman, 125 Mo.App. 683, 103 S.W. 121, 123 (1907); Walker v. Cook,
33 Ill.App. 561, 565 (1889) (duty to testify once the expert is served with a subpoena, so
that there is no consideration for an agreement to pay additional compensation) ; Dodge
v. Stiles, 26 Conn. 463, 465 (1857) ("It can not be important in our view, whether the
promise be made after the service of the subpoena, co-temporaneously with it, or before,
provided the promise refers to this duty [to testify] and is founded on no other con-
sideration").
7. The expert is aware that if served with a subpoena he will not be paid any more
than the statutory fee prescribed for ordinary witnesses. He will have to answer the
questions put to him, but he may be unable to form an expert opinion without some
previous study of the problem, or, as in the case of the document examiner, an examina-
tion of the handwriting specimens, questioned documents, etc., with the aid of some of his
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Some jurisdictions, on the other hand, will not compel the expert to
give an opinion calling for the exercise of his professional judgment,
when he has not been offered reasonable compensation for the use of his
skills.8 Although there are no decisions directly in point, there should
be no objection in these jurisdictions to the expert's being compelled to
testify after he has been offered reasonable compensation, since he would
then receive payment for his special services.9 Since the expert is under
no legal duty to testify without being offered a reasonable fee, no prob-
lem of consideration for the fee exists so long as it is not in excess of
a reasonable amount.' 0 Logically, however, his willingness to testify
will not constitute sufficient consideration for a fee in excess of a reason-
able amount, since he would be under a legal duty to testify for less."-
This approach gives adequate protection to the interests of the expert,
but does not solve the problems of the litigant who cannot afford to pay
more than the statutory fee.
A possible solution for the indigent litigant who wants to hire an
expert witness is the contingent fee contract. In Barnes v. Boatman's
National Bank,'2 such a contract was utilized by a party-litigant who, in
contesting a will, employed a psychiatrist whose fee was to be contingent
upon the outcome of the case. The contract was held valid by the Mis-
equipment. Thus, as a practical matter, the expert must ordinarily be employed at a
suitable fee.
8. See note 3 supra.
9. See note 3 supra. In this situation, the expert witness and the party who seeks his
services may agree on a suitable fee before the trial, or it may be understood that the
expert will submit a bill when his services are completed. It is often wiser for the
expert to reach some understanding with his employer concerning his charges for the
work involved before the lawsuit, if there is one pending; otherwise he may find it
difficult to collect even the most reasonable charges. One writer suggests that in any case
the expert should be prompt in submitting his bill, or reach an understanding as to when
he is to be paid, and then remind the client of the expected remuneration immediately before
the suit. "Interest is the spur that prompts payment. Indifference grows with time, especially
after work is finished." Collecting from Clients, 4 DOCKET 3599 (April, 1933).
10. Stanton v. Rushmore, 11 N.J.Misc. 544, 166 At. 707 (1933), af'd, 112 N.J.L. 115,
169 At. 721 (1934) (the court held that a contract calling for a suitable fee was not
void as against public policy or for lack of consideration, even though the physician was
subpoenaed) ; Barrus v. Phaneuf, 166 Mass. 123, 44 N.E. 141 (1896).
11. Except in United States v. Cooper, 21 D.C. 491, 493 (1893), this point apparently
has not been passed upon. Here, the court states that the witness can be compelled to testify
"where his reasonable fees, beyond the, common witness fees, had been tendered him."
The opinion cites as authority Ex parte Roelker, 20 Fed. Cas. 1092 (1st Cir. 1854). This
case, however, stands only for the proposition that an expert in a particular profession (here,
a German interpreter) cannot be compelled to testify so long as other experts in the same
profession "might without difficulty, be induced to attend for an adequate compensa-
tion. . . ." See also Bomar, The Compensation of Expert Witnesses, 2 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROa. 510 (1935), who, on the authority of United States v. Cooper, supra, states that,
"it has been held that there is a duty to testify after 'reasonable fees' beyond the
statutory fees have been tendered. . . . Certainly, there should be no doubt on this point.
To allow the expert to demand a prohibitive fee and refuse to testify would be to allow
him to defeat justice by withholding testimony necessary for a proper determination of
the case." Id. at 516.
12. 348 Mo. 1032, 1 156 S.W.2d 597 (1941).
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souri court in spite of objections that such an agreement was unsupported
by consideration and was against public policy because it encouraged
perjured testimony.13 Dealing with the consideration problem, the court
distinguished between a contract for an expert to testify "on a subject
with which he is already conversant," and one requiring him "to espe-
cially fit himself for lines of inquiry."'1 - In the first case, "it is against
public policy to pay anything other than the regular witness fee ... ;" in
the second, he is entitled to additional compensation for performing
"professional services and the like."'' 5 In effect, this is the same view
taken by some jurisdictions in regard to the consideration problem-that
a contract for compensation in addition to the statutory fee would not
be invalid for lack of consideration where the expert is asked to do addi-
tional work in preparation for testifying.16
In order to meet the objection that the contract is invalid because it
encourages perjured testimony, the court in the Barnes case found that
the services rendered before trial are the subject matter of the contract,
and the expert's testimony was only an incidental objective. Whatever
the merits of this line of reasoning, it has not been accepted in other
jurisdictions, and such contingent fee contracts in which the expert is
expected to testify have uniformly been held invalid where the question
has arisen.'" The expert himself will frequently refuse to testify on such
a basis, either because of knowledge of the unenforceability of such
contracts or because of personal distaste for them. He may, however,
be asked to work for a client whose ability to pay his fee will depend
on the outcome of anticipated litigation. Here the fee will be due and
payable regardless of the outcome of the suit or criminal trial, although
the expert is aware that he will probably be unable to collect if his client
loses. The honest expert may take the risk of not being paid, or may
simply refuse to testify. Others might find it convenient to alter their
judgment in order to produce the desired result in the litigation. Con-
sequently, the same public policy objection would appear to apply
13. Id. at 104-1, 156 S.W.2d at 602. Contra: Miller v. Anderson, 183 Wis. 163, 196
N.W. 869 (1924); Sherman v. Burton, 165 Mich. 293, 297, 130 N.W. 667, 668 (1911);
Davis v. Smoot, 176 N.C. 538, 54-1, 97 S.E. 488, 489 (1918) ; for a strong criticism of the
Barnes decision, see Morgan, The Law of E'vidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARv. L. REv. 481, 534
(1946).
14. Barnes v. Boatman's National Bank, 348 Mo. 1032, 1038, 156 S.W.2d 597, 601 (1941).
15. Ibid. This was the holding in Burnett v. Freeman, 125 Mo.App. 683, 103 S.W.
121 (1907).
16. See note 2 supra. In the Barnes case the expert was asked to do extra work by
way of (1) preparing himself to testify, and (2) advising counsel in the case. 348 Mo.
at 1039, 156 S.W.2d at 601.
17. Barnes v. Boatman's National Bank, supra note 16.
18. See note 13 supra; see also 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §1716, n. 4 (Rev. ed. 1938),
containing cases on this point.
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whether the fee is contingent because expressly made so, or contingent
because of the probability that it will be uncollectible in case of an unfav-
orable result in the litigation.
The American Law Institute has offered an alternative solution which
is intended to secure unbiased expert testimony for all litigants. The
Model Code of Evidence, in Rules 403 through 410, provides for court-
appointed experts whose compensation for testimony in a criminal action
is to be fixed by the court and paid by the county or state. In a civil
suit, compensation would be paid "by the parties in such proportions
and at such times as he [the trial judge] shall prescribe . . .," or by the
county or state in whatever proportion the court decides. 19 The Model
Code does not prohibit parties from hiring their own expert witnesses ;20
it merely attempts to discourage this practice by providing that, "The
fee of an expert witness called by a party but not appointed by the judge
shall be paid by the party calling him but shall not be taxed as costs in
the action.
'" 21
There are objections to the approach of the Model Code in that it
may increase the costs of litigation to the county or state, especially in
a criminal trial, and may unduly burden members of the various profes-
sions who are appointed to testify repeatedly. It would seem, however,
that the latter objection could be met simply enough by not requiring
the testimony of an unwilling witness when others are readily available.
As to the former objection, it seems the cost assessed against the county
19. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE, Rule 403 (1942), provides for the appointment of expert
witnesses by the trial judge, "on his own motion or at the request of a party. . . ." Rule
410 provides:
"The compensation of each expert witness appointed by the judge shall be fixed at
a reasonable amount. In a criminal action it shall be paid by [insert the name of the
proper public authority] under order of the judge. In a civil action it shall be paid . . . by
the parties in such proportions and at such times as he shall prescribe, or that the
proportion of any party be paid by [insert the name of the proper public authority],
and that, after payment by the parties or [insert the name of the public
authority] or both, all or part or none of it be taxed as costs in the action. Any
witness appointed by the judge who receives any compensation other than that fixed
by the judge and any person who pays or offers or promises to pay such other com-
pensation shall be guilty of contempt of court. . . ."
See also MODEL CODE OF EVmENTCE 215 (1942): "No doubt in the usual case the judge
will provide that the expense of the experts shall be taxed as costs and paid by the
loser [in civil cases]. . . . He may [on the other hand] think it wise to excuse an im-
pecunious party from paying his proportionate share. .. ."
20. MODEL CODE OF EVIDEN CE, Rule 404, provides that a party may call his own expert
witness, "if the judge finds that
a) the party has given reasonable notice to each adverse party of the name and
address of the witness to be called, or
b) it is expedient, notwithstanding a failure to give such notice, to permit the witness
to be called."
21. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 410.
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or state in a criminal action is not too great a price to pay for unbiased
expert testimony in the interests of greater justice.
22
Under Rule 403, presumably, a party would have little difficulty in
persuading the judge to appoint an expert witness, if he could convince
him that such testimony would "be of substantial assistance." 23 Further-
more, the judge can, under Rule 405, "on his own motion or that of a
party," require the expert to "make such inspection and examination of
the person, thing, place or matter concerning which he is to give evi-
dence as the judge deems necessary .... ,,24 Thus, there should be no
problem for the litigant who wishes to have the expert witness examine
depositions or questioned documents, or compare specimens of hand-
writing.
25
Some objections to Rule 405 may remain insofar as it could enable
the court to compel an unwilling expert to make pre-trial examinations
or investigations or perform other services not involving the giving of
testimony. There appears to be a fear in some jurisdictions that an
expert who is compelled to perform such services may be unduly bur-
dened.26 This problem was met in the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, Rule 28, by providing that, "An expert witness shall not be
appointed by the court unless he consents to act. .... -27 A similar pro-
22. In support of the court-appointed expert provided for in Rules 403 thru 410, see
McCormick, Science, Experts and the Courts, 29 TEXAs L. REV. 611, 623 (1951).
23. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 403 (1942), provides, in part, "In an action in
which the judge determines that expert evidence will be of substantial assistance, he may,
of his own motion or at the request of a party, at any time during the pendency of the
action ...
b) appoint one or more expert witnesses . . . to give evidence in the action.
24. Ibid. Under Rule 405, "the scope and manner of the inspection or examination
.. . as to which a dispute has arisen . . ." is to be determined by the judge.
25. A problem not, apparently, covered by the Model Code, is that of the indigent
party who wants an expert to advise his attorney on what questions to ask of the expert
witnesses who are called to testify. This problem does not properly belong within the
scope of the Model Code's Chapter V, since such an expert would not, in all probability,
be permitted to testify. For this limited purpose, the contingent fee contract may be a
proper solution, so long as it is understood that the expert so employed will not be called
upon to testify.
26. Stevens v. Worcester, 196, Mass. 45, 56, 81 N.E. 907, 910 (1907) ("The auditor
rightly ruled that the witness . ..could not be compelled to study the case or perform labor
in order to qualify him to express an opinion. . . .") "The coroner might have compelled
him [the physician] to swear to his opinion on a superficial view of the body; but he could
not have compelled him to touch it, or do the more nauseous and dangerous work of opening
it." Allegheny County v. Watt, 3 Pa. St. 462, 464 (1846). Two states have statutes which
enable the trial judge to compel the expert to make such an examination. IDAHO CODE tit. 19,
§4303 (1948) ; TENN. STAT. tit. 5, §§11882, 11883 (1943).
27. FED. F. CRIM. P., Rule 28, provides:
"The court may order the defendant or the government or both to show cause why expert
witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations.
The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may
appoint witnesses of its own selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed by the
court unless he consents to act ... The court may determine the reasonable compensation
of such a witness and direct its payment out of such funds as may be provided by law.
The parties also may call expert witnesses of their own selection."
Similar provisions are to be found in: Wis. STATS. §357.27(1) (1951) ; CAL. PEN. CODE
§1027 (Deering, 1951).
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